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Abstract
Problem gambling is a serious socio-economic problem involving high individual
and social costs. In this paper, we study risk preferences of problem gamblers including
their risk attitudes in the gain and loss domains, their weighting of probabilities, and
their degree of loss aversion. Our findings indicate that problem gamblers are
systematically more risk taking and less sensitive towards changes in probabilities in the
gain domain only. Neither their risk attitudes in the loss domain nor their degree of loss
aversion are significantly different from the controls. Additional evidence for a similar
degree of sensitivity towards negative outcomes is gained from skin conductance data –
a psychophysiological marker for emotional arousal – in a threat-of-shock-task.
Keywords: Gambling; Probability Weighting; Risk; Addiction; Skin Conductance
Responses
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It’s all about gains: Risk preferences in problem gambling
Problem gambling is considered to be a public health concern with an average
prevalence ranging from 0.5 to 7.6% worldwide (Williams, Volberg, & Stevens, 2012).
Reported consequences include financial problems (Moghaddam, Yoon, Campos, &
Fong, 2015), social isolation (Trevorrow & Moore, 1998), depression (Clarke, 2006), and
suicide (Ledgerwood & Petry, 2004). In this study, we compare the risk preferences of
problem gamblers to two types of controls – habitual gamblers and non-gambling
controls. By comparing these three groups, we aim at contributing to our
understanding of the behavioral correlates of gambling addiction. But before we outline
different psychological mechanisms that potentially explain excessive risk taking
observed in gamblers, we give a brief overview of prospect theory, which is currently the
most prominent descriptive theory of decision making under risk (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). This will be the starting point for our analysis and we will discuss
hypotheses for gambling addiction and differences among the three groups within this
framework. While our study is motivated by prospect theory, the general part of our
analysis does not rely on this theory, but it is more generally valid as it relies on an
analysis of certainty equivalents.
Prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) has three main components:
First, outcomes are evaluated relative to a reference point such that positive deviations
are coded as gains and negative ones as losses. Second, outcomes in prospect theory are
evaluated by a value function v which satisfies diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion.
Diminishing sensitivity means that the marginal value is decreasing if one moves further
away from the reference point implying a concave (convex) value function in the gain
(loss) domain. This assumption accommodates the reflection effect, which summarizes
empirical evidence that people are typically risk averse (seeking) for gains (losses). Loss
aversion indicates that a given loss has a higher impact on the attractiveness of a
lottery than a gain of equal size and is captured by a value function that is steeper for
losses than for gains. Finally, probabilities in prospect theory are transformed by a
weighting function w: [0, 1]→ [0, 1] which is strictly increasing and satisfies w(0) = 0
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and w(1) = 1. Originally, the weighting function was proposed to capture the tendency
of people to overweight small and underweight large probabilities. Nowadays, there
exists ample evidence that the weighting function is inverse S-shaped for most
individuals which besides the overweighting (underweighting) of small (large)
probabilities implies a relative insensitivity towards probability changes for medium
sized probabilities (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & Paraschiv, 2007; Tversky & Fox, 1995).
Within the prospect theory framework, different psychological mechanisms exist
that potentially explain excessive risk taking observed in gambling addiction. First,
gambling is typically associated with small probabilities of winning. Gambling
addiction might therefore be related to a systematic distorted probability weighting,
such that small winning probabilities are more strongly overweighted. This distortion
would make gambling more attractive and thus offers an explanation for excessive
gambling (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Within the framework of prospect theory, this
so-called probability distortion hypothesis (Ligneul, Sescousse, Barbalat, Domenech, &
Dreher, 2012) would be reflected by a more distorted probability weighting function in
the gain domain. Among other things, our approach enables us to study the weighting
function in the gain domain and thus allows a direct test of this hypothesis.
Secondly, gambling addiction might arise from a general upward shift in risk
preferences (Ligneul et al., 2012). This theory is supported by empirical evidence
showing increased risk taking behavior of problem gamblers in many other domains
besides gambling (Powell, Hardoon, Derevensky, & Gupta, 1999; Slutske, Caspi, Moffitt,
& Poulton, 2005). This so-called probability elevation hypothesis (Ligneul et al., 2012)
would imply that problem gamblers, in general, overweight (underweight) probabilities
of gains (losses) over the whole probability range. Within the framework of prospect
theory, this hypothesis would express itself in an upward (downward) shifted probability
weighting function in the gain (loss) domain. Because we elicit risk preferences in the
gain and loss domains, we can test this hypothesis. Ligneul et al. (2012) found
empirical support for this hypothesis by analyzing gain-only lotteries with varying
probabilities of winning. Because gambling is a decision that involves a trade-off of
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potential gains and losses considering gains only is not sufficient to conclude that the
elevation hypothesis actually drives gambling behavior. This conclusion requires besides
the higher elevation in the domain of gains an elevation in the domain of losses which is
equal or less for gamblers than for controls. Furthermore, the authors used an
unincentivized risk elicitation task. Within the literature, it is still debated as to which
extent behavior differs under real vs. hypothetical incentives (Kühberger,
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 2002). With respect to risk preferences, some studies
with representative population samples observe no different behavior under real vs.
hypothetical incentives (Noussair, Trautmann, & Van de Kuilen, 2013; von Gaudecker,
van Soest, & Wengstrom, 2011). Others, by contrast, suggest that behavior is indeed
systematically different (Edwards, 1953) and that participants actually apply different
choice strategies (Slovic, 1969). Additionally, there is evidence that the brain circuity
that is active during real choice is different than under hypothetical choice in many
domains (Camerer & Mobbs, 2017). While this is clearly an important debate, and no
consensus or underlying theory has so far been reached, this issue becomes even more
important in our case as we study financial risk attitudes of problem gamblers.
Traditionally, money has been identified as a main motivator for gambling (Anselme &
Robinson, 2013; Schüll, 2012) and it appears implausible that gambling without the
thrill of winning/losing money would adequately fulfill a gambler’s desires. This
statement is supported by studies showing different brain activation during the
anticipation and realization of real monetary outcomes in problem gamblers as
compared to non-gambling controls (Luijten, Schellekens, Kühn, Machielse, &
Sescousse, 2017). Following the literature, we randomly choose one lottery for payment
at the end of the experiment to provide some real incentives and to make our laboratory
experiment more comparable to real-world behavior (Ariely & Norton, 2007).
Finally, problem gamblers might be significantly less loss averse, which refers to
the relative steepness of the value function in the loss to the gain domain (Tom, Fox,
Poldrack, & Trepel, 2007). We elicit the degree of loss aversion for each participant,
which allows us to test this loss aversion hypothesis. Additionally, we record skin
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conductance responses (SCRs) in a threat-of-shock-task to test for differences in
sensitivity towards negative outcomes. SCRs describe variations in the electrical
properties of the skin caused by sweat secretion. Under sympathetic nervous system
activity, sweat gland activity increases and thereby reduces the electric resistance of the
skin. Changes in the electrodermal properties of the skin are therefore commonly
interpreted as measures of sympathetic and emotional arousal (Boucsein, 1992). Our
motivation to include this experiment into our study – although it is based on a
different dependent measure (physiological responses vs. choice behavior) and different
stimulus (sensory stimulus vs. monetary stimulus) – is thought to increase the
robustness of our work for at least two reasons. Firstly, losses are regularly and typically
experienced more often than gains during gambling. As outlined above, an insensitivity
towards losses is a plausible explanation for excessive gambling. From a methodological
point of view, however, it is a challenge to simulate real monetary losses in laboratory
environments, as participants almost never put their own money at stake. With an
initial endowment, it is unclear whether decision making is actually taking place in the
loss domain relative to the status quo. Alternatively, physical pain, as done in this
study via electric shocks, has been suggested as an appropriate tool to induce real losses
in the lab (Berns, Capra, Moore, & Noussair, 2008). Finding converging evidence using
monetary and non-monetary losses should therefore be seen as an indication of
robustness of our results. Secondly, SCRs as markers of emotional arousal have
commonly been used to study how individuals perceive risky situations. It has been
shown that SCRs are sensitive towards probabilities and magnitudes of outcomes (Berns
et al., 2008; Ring & Kaernbach, 2015; Studer & Clark, 2011). Some theories, such as the
somatic marker theory (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997), actually suggest
that body signals can have a behavior guiding function. Using SCRs as a dependent
variable and finding converging evidence with behavioral measures can therefore be seen
as a methodological extension of our work and potentially stimulates further discussions
on the relation between somatic signals and behavior in gambling addiction.
The loss aversion hypothesis has been tested in several studies yielding mixed
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results (Brevers et al., 2012; Gelskov, Madsen, Ramsøy, & Siebner, 2016; Giorgetta et
al., 2014; Takeuchi et al., 2015). While these studies consider both gains and losses by
analyzing gambles with a 50/50 chance of winning or losing, they do not control for
probability weighting. In gambling decisions, winning and losing probabilities can vary
and typically the chances of winning (losing) are smaller (larger) than 50%. Therefore,
it appears necessary to additionally control for probability weighting.
The prospect theory model has been applied to explain gambling behavior before.
In racetrack betting, for example, it has been shown that horses with high chances of
winning are often underbet, while horses with low chances of winning are often overbet
(Ali, 1977; Griffith, 1949; Weitzman, 1965). Probability weighting seems to be an
important driver underlying this observation (Jullien & Salanié, 2000; Snowberg &
Wolfers, 2010). Similarly, probability weighting can explain why people tend to buy
more lottery tickets as jackpots are increasing even when the absolute chance of
winning decreases accordingly (Cook & Clotfelter, 1993). The above-mentioned studies
apply the prospect theory framework to study gambling behavior and suggest that
probability weighting is important. While these studies analyze the betting behavior of
whole markets, our paper addresses a different, albeit related, issue, which is a
comparison of risk preferences between gamblers vs. non-gambling controls. In
particular, we aim at providing a comprehensive analysis of problem gamblers’ risk
preferences including the gain and loss domains. Our main findings suggest that
gamblers systematically overweight small to medium probabilities of winning, while we
do not observe any systematic differences in the loss domain. In fact, there is a
significant change of behavior observed from the loss to the gain domain in gamblers
compared to controls. These findings provide one possible explanation why some
individuals persist in gambling activities – despite their severe negative consequences –
while the general population does not. The observation that problem gamblers’ risk
preferences are selectively different from the general population should be considered in
behavioral therapies and medical treatment of gambling addiction, as well as in legal
regulations of gambling markets. We outline potential applications.
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Method
Participants
For the current study, we recruited 74 participants (mean age = 38.9 years,
SD = 14.7 years). Participants were recruited via advertisements in local newspapers.
We had one call which was explicitly targeting regular gamblers and one call which was
not. The calls were placed bi-weekly without any overlap. During the initial phone
contact, we informed the potential participants about the general experimental
procedure and excluded potential participants based on the following criteria:
• Problematic (illegal) drug consumption, i.e., drug consumption at least once a
week.
• A medically diagnosed history of psychiatric or neurological disorder.
• Standard MRI exclusion criteria.
Next, participants were invited to the University Hospital in Kiel, Germany, for a
semi-structured interview (Grant, Steinberg, Kim, Rounsaville, & Potenza, 2004) in
order to evaluate their gambling behavior. The interviews were conducted by certified
psychologists and took approximately 30 minutes. From our sample, 25 participants
fulfilled at least three of the DSM-IV-TR criteria (American Psychiatric Association,
2000) for pathological gambling and therefore can be classified as problem gamblers
(PG group, four females) (Fong et al., 2011; Weintraub et al., 2009). Furthermore, 23
participants were classified as habitual gamblers (HG group, three females). These
participants fulfilled less than three criteria of the DSM-IV-TR criteria, but were
gambling at least once per week. Additionally, 26 participants, who gambled less than
once per month, were recruited as a non-gambling control group (C group, five females).
All participants gave written informed consent and could decide to discontinue
participation at any time. The research protocol was approved by the local ethics
committee of the University Hospital in Kiel and the study was conducted in
accordance with the guidelines of the Declaration of Helsinki.
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A power analysis indicates that our sample gives us an 87% chance of detecting
large differences (d = 0.8) in risk preferences between gamblers and controls using a
one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test at p < .050. Given the fact that we compare extreme
cases of behavior – participants with a medically diagnosed addiction to gambling vs.
non-gambling controls – we expect the differences in the main underlying drivers,
namely risk preferences, to be large. This assumption is supported by the literature
which reports that the effect size (d) of the difference in the elevation of the probability
weighting function between problem gamblers and non-gambling controls observed by
Ligneul et al. (2012) was 0.94. This effect is even larger than the one assumed in the
previous power analysis. Assuming this effect size, our sample is adequately large to
detect differences in the elevation at p < .050 using a one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test
with a 94% chance. It is worth noting that a meta-analysis reveals an almost large effect
size (d = 0.79) for stronger delayed reward discounting in problem gamblers than in
non-gambling controls supporting the view that effect sizes can be expected to be large.
Besides the DSM-IV-TR criteria, participants answered the South Oaks Gambling
Screen (SOGS) (Lesieur & Blume, 1987) in order to obtain a continuous variable for
their gambling behavior. Higher values indicate a higher probability for gambling
addiction. As expected, the PG group has the highest mean SOGS-score of 8.36
(SD = 3.82), followed by the HG group with a mean score of 3.96 (SD = 2.96) and the
C group with a mean score of 0.42 (SD = 0.99). Because the distribution of the
SOGS-scores in our sample violates the normality assumption (Shapiro-Wilk test,
W = 0.86, p < .001) and we have less than 30 observations per group (Moffatt, 2015), a
(non-parametric) Kruskall-Wallis test was used to test for significant differences in
SOGS-scores among the three groups. The test indicates that the groups were
significantly different with respect to their SOGS-scores (H(2) = 48.41, p < .001, see
Table S1). Post-hoc tests after Dunn with Bonferroni correction revealed that all three
groups were significantly different (p < .001). Following the classification by Bonnaire,
Bungener, and Varescon (2017), 9 problem gamblers mainly engaged in non-strategic
gambles (lottery, scratch cards or slot machines), 3 in strategic gambles (horse race
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betting, sport betting or card games), and 13 in both types of gambles. From our HG
group, 8 participants mainly engaged in non-strategic gambles, 9 in strategic gambles,
and 6 in both. The PG group in general engaged in a greater variety of gambling types.
All three groups were matched based on characteristics that potentially affect task
performance independent of gambling behavior such as demographic variables (age,
gender, income, education), and alcohol and cigarette consumption (Kruskall-Wallis
tests, p > .250, see Table S1). For the matching, we first recruited a gambler and then
aimed at finding a control participant that was as similar as possible in terms of the
above outlined variables. This procedure was thought to reduce the risk of other
potential confounds as much as possible in our quasi-experimental design. Compared to
a larger (n=300) gambling disorder sample from Germany by Wejbera, Müller, Becker,
and Beutel (2017), our PG group appears representative in terms of age (our sample:
38.48±15.13; Wejbera et al. (2017): 33.32±11.55) and gender distribution (our sample:
16% females; Wejbera et al. (2017): 11% females).
After the psychological interview, participants took part in a risk elicitation task,
which is described in the next subsection, and a time-preference elicitation task, which
is not reported here. Then, they participated in a threat-of-shock-task, which is also
outlined in the next subsection. The experimental session concluded with an fMRI
experiment, which is not reported here. The whole procedure took about 3.5 hours.
Risk elicitation task
In the experimental task by Vieider, Lefebvre, et al. (2015), participants make
repeated decisions between binary monetary lotteries and different sure monetary
outcomes. The task elicits risk preferences for gain-only, loss-only and for mixed
lotteries. This feature allows us to study risk attitudes in the (i) gain and (ii) loss
domains, (iii) probability weighting, and (iv) the degree of loss aversion. These four
measures will be compared across the three groups and tested according to the above
outlined theories on gambling behavior.
In the pure gain (loss) domain, one outcome is positive (negative) while the other
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outcome is typically zero. The magnitude of the first outcome and the winning (losing)
probabilities are manipulated over different choice situations. In the gain domain,
participants typically choose the lottery for low sure payments. When the sure payment
rises, participants switch and start to prefer the sure payment at a certain point. This
is the so-called certainty equivalent, i.e., the point where the individual is just
indifferent between the sure payment and the lottery. In the loss domain, this behavior
is reversed, i.e., participants typically prefer a small sure loss over the lottery and
switch as the small sure loss increases. In order to cover potential losses, participants
received an initial endowment that was as large as the largest possible loss. The task
has a total of 29 choice situations (14 for gains, 13 for losses and 2 for mixed outcomes).
In the mixed prospects, participants state a loss that makes them indifferent between
playing a 50/50 lottery involving a certain price and the stated loss, or the status quo
which equals zero. The original task includes one mixed lottery. We added a second for
robustness. Instructions for this task can be found under
http://www.ferdinandvieider.com/instructions_English_Euros.pdf and a
summary of the used choice situations is available in Table S2. Lotteries where
participants had multiple switching points were excluded from the following analysis.
This happened in three cases. For the individual payment, one decision was randomly
selected and realized for each participant. This is a standard protocol in the literature
(Cox, Sadiraj, & Schmidt, 2015). The possible payments for this task ranged from 0 to
40 Euros.
Non-parametric data analysis of risk preferences
Based on procedures suggested by Vieider and colleagues (Vieider et al., in press;
Vieider, Chmura, et al., 2015; Vieider, Lefebvre, et al., 2015; Vieider, Truong,
Martinsson, & Khanh, 2013), we normalise certainty equivalents such that values below
(above) the objective probability indicate risk aversion (risk seeking) in the gain
domain. In the loss domain, this characteristic is reversed. The normalisation can be
derived mathematically as follows:
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The experimental design is based on lotteries with two outcomes. We denote these
outcomes by x and y such that |x| > |y| ≥ 0. Now if x and y are either both gains or
both losses, according to prospect theory, the utility of lottery P in which you win x
with probability p is given by
PT (P ) = w(p)v(x) + [1− w(p)]v(y). (1)
Assuming a linear value function where v(x) = x, we get according to the previous
equation
CE(P ) = w(p)x+ (1− w(p))y (2)
where CE(P ) is the elicited certainty equivalent. Applying a linear value function
deserves some further justification. Originally, the value function was proposed to
capture the tendency that the marginal value of gains and losses is decreasing with their
magnitude, i.e., that "[...] the difference in value between a gain of 100 and a gain of 200
appears to be greater than the difference between a gain of 1,100 and a gain of 1,200"
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 278). This form implies that individuals are risk averse
for gains and risk seeking for losses. Given the small monetary amounts that are at
stake in our experiment, it appears, however, unlikely that the marginal value of money
starts declining and plausibly explains risk preferences. In the literature, the value
function is often assumed to be linear for moderate stakes (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, &
L’Haridon, 2008). Additionally, there is evidence that gambling behavior is driven by
probability rather than outcome transformations (Snowberg & Wolfers, 2010).
Acknowledging these statements implies that introducing a non-linear value function
into our model would only pick up some of the attitudes towards risk that would
otherwise be taken up by probability weighting (Vieider et al., 2013; Zeisberger, Vrecko,
& Langer, 2012). The resulting estimations would necessarily be less precise (Yaari,
1965; Zeisberger et al., 2012). Therefore, we report our results under the linear value
function assumption within the paper. Nevertheless, we provide a section on robustness
checks. There we show that our results remain stable if we assume a common power
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value function as suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) of the form v(x) = xα
with α = 0.5 or 0.75. Additionally, our results are robust if we estimate a full prospect
theory model including the aforementioned power value function.
For y = 0 equation 2 immediately shows that w(p) > (<)p implies risk seeking
(aversion) in the gain domain and risk aversion (seeking) in the loss domain. Solving
equation 2 for w(p) yields
CE(P )− y
x− y = w(p). (3)
In the following, we will call (CE(P )− y)/(x− y) a normalised certainty
equivalent. The normalised certainty equivalent equals p in the case of risk neutrality
(i.e., w(p) = p) whereas it is less than (exceeds) p in the case of risk aversion (seeking)
in the gain domain. In the loss domain, this characteristic is reversed. For illustrative
purposes, the analysis of the present paper will rely on normalised certainty equivalents
instead of regular certainty equivalents. Since a higher regular certainty equivalent
implies a higher normalised certainty equivalent, this procedure does not involve any
assumptions or restrictions. Therefore, this part of the analysis does not rely on
prospect theory or the linear value assumption, but it is valid in a very general sense.
For mixed gambles, we calculate the ratio between the potential gain and the
elicited loss that makes the participant just indifferent between playing the lottery or
the status quo. The point of loss neutrality would be indicated by a ratio of unity,
higher values indicate loss aversion, and smaller values indicate loss seeking. Since we
have two mixed lotteries, we average the two ratios for each participant to get a more
stable estimate of their degree of loss aversion.
Parametric data analysis of risk preferences
Having provided a non-parametric analysis of our data, we fit functional forms to
our data. This approach takes the repeated observations into account and thereby
allows us a more precise separation of noise from underlying preferences (Vieider,
Lefebvre, et al., 2015). This approach is motivated by prospect theory. We will use the
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probability weighting function developed by Prelec (1998)
w(p) = e−δ(− ln p)γ (4)
where δ measures the elevation of the weighting function. Smaller values of δ shift
the weighting function upwards. γ measures the degree of curvature. Smaller values of
γ indicate a more pronounced inverse S-shape (Fox & Poldrack, 2013). We use the
confidence intervals (CI) of the fits to see differences among the groups. The algorithm
was initialized with values of 0.7 for both δ and γ (Vieider, Lefebvre, et al., 2015).
Changing both starting values to 0.3 did not change the results. No additional
boundary conditions were applied.
Threat-of-shock-task
The threat-of-shock-task, which we applied in one of our previous studies (Ring &
Kaernbach, 2015), has two stages. In the first stage, the probability of receiving an
unpleasant electric shock is revealed. In the second stage, which follows after an
anticipation phase of 9.7 seconds, the electric shock is then applied or not accordingly.
Detailed information about the task, as well as on the psychophysiological measurement
device and the electric shock device can be found in the SI. It has been shown that SCRs
during the anticipation phase increase with the probability of receiving the electric
shock (Ring & Kaernbach, 2015). This allows us to test whether there are differences in
terms of emotional body reactions in anticipation of negative events among our groups.
Data analysis
Skin conductance data was analyzed using Ledalab (www.ledalab.de) applying
continuous decomposition analysis to disentangle phasic components from tonic activity
(Benedek & Kaernbach, 2010). The integrated SCRs (ISCR), which is defined as the
time integral of the phasic driver for a relevant time interval, was used as a measure for
the phasic electrodermal response to a given stimulus. ISCRs were calculated during
the anticipation phase of the above-described task. In order to account for the typical
delay in SCRs of about 1.5 seconds after stimulus presentation (Boucsein, 1992), we
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focus on the time interval of +1.5 to +9.7 seconds after revealing the shock probability.
Due to skewness of skin conductance data, we take the square root of each response
(Boucsein, 1992).
Statistical analysis
Statistical analysis was performed using the computing environment R (R version
3.3.2 (R Development Core Team, 2016); RStudio version 0.99.486 (RStudio Team,
2015)). Probability weighting functions were fitted using non-linear least squares
regression with the function nls of the stats package (R Development Core Team, 2016).
Confidence intervals for the two-parameter probability weighting functions were
calculated using Monte Carlo simulations with the predictNLS function from the
propagate package (Spiess, 2014). Random effects ordinary least squares regressions
were performed with the function plm of the plm package (Croissant & Millo, 2008).
Power analyses were performed with G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner,
2007).
Data availability
Our stimulus material (threat-of-shock-task), data (behavioral and physiological)
as well as our R code for statistical analysis and figure/table preparation are publicly
accessible at https://osf.io/n45ky/.
Results
Non-parametric results on behavioral risk preferences
First, we compare the normalised certainty equivalents of the three different
groups across decision domains. As outlined above, this analysis does not rely on
prospect theory. We perform this analysis based on a group comparison as well as on
SOGS-scores. Figure 1 shows normalised certainty equivalents by probability of winning
for the three different groups. At the smallest probability of winning (prob = .125), all
three groups have a normalised certainty equivalent which is larger than the objective
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Figure 1 . Risk preferences in the gain domain by probability and group. Error bars
indicate the standard errors of the mean. Black horizontal lines indicate risk neutrality.
If the normalised certainty equivalent is above the black horizontal line, this indicates
risk seeking. If the normalised certainty equivalent is below the black horizontal line,
this indicates risk aversion.
probability (the objective probability is marked by a black horizontal line). This
suggests risk seeking behavior at this particular probability level. With increasing
objective probabilities of winning, participants, on average, become risk neutral and
finally risk averse. The points where the different groups switch to risk avoiding
behavior are different (C group: prob > .250; HG group: prob > .500; PG group:
prob > .625).
Now, we can test whether the elicited certainty equivalents are different among
the three groups and whether there are differences in the weighting of probabilities. To
do so, we run random effects ordinary least squares regressions. This approach allows us
to enter the probability level as an independent variable and thereby to control for
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Figure 2 . Risk preferences in the loss domain by probability and group. Error bars
indicate the standard errors of the mean. Black horizontal lines indicate risk neutrality.
If the normalised certainty equivalent is above the black horizontal line, this indicates
risk aversion. If the normalised certainty equivalent is below the black horizontal line,
this indicates risk seeking.
within-subject differences in probability weighting (Moffatt, 2015; Vieider, Lefebvre, et
al., 2015). A detailed description of this method is provided by Moffatt (2015).
Table S3 displays the result for an analysis where we compare the PG and HG group to
the C group. As displayed in regression I, the PG group is significantly more risk taking
than the C group, which is indicated by a positive and significant coefficient for PG
group (β = 0.126, SE = 0.039, p = .001). The coefficient for HG group is also
positive, but smaller than the coefficient for PG group and not significant
(β = 0.053, SE = 0.040, p = .187). Furthermore, the analysis shows that the
significant probability coefficient is smaller than unity indicating probability
insensitivity in the overall sample (β = 0.641, SE = 0.025, p < .001). This finding was
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Table 1
Kruskall-Wallis tests and subsequent Post-Hoc tests after Dunn for different probability
levels in the gain domain.
Objective probability p.overall PG vs. C PG vs. HG C vs. HG
.125 < .001 < .001 .017 .104
.250 .021 .006 .090 .326
.375 .001 < .001 .062 .081
.500 .013 .003 .121 .186
.625 .197 - - -
.750 .713 - - -
.850 .514 - - -
expected and also previously reported (Vieider, Lefebvre, et al., 2015). In order to test
whether there are differences in probability weighting among the three groups,
regression II adds an interaction term for the group classification and probability. The
interaction term for the PG group is negative and significant indicating that the PG
group is significantly more insensitive towards changes in probabilities than the C group
(β = −0.307, SE = 0.058, p < .001). For the HG group the interaction term is
negative, but not significant (β = −0.045, SE = 0.060, p > .250). Altogether this
analysis shows that the PG group is both more risk taking and less sensitive towards
changes in probability than the C group in the gain domain.
As a robustness check, we average the normalised certainty equivalents per
participant and probability level, and compare all groups by means of Kruskall-Wallis
tests (uncorrected for multiple testing) for each probability level. Our results show that
the groups are significantly different at prob ≤ 0.5 with a significance level of p < .050.
Exact p-values for the Kruskall-Wallis tests and p-values for subsequent Post-Hoc tests
after Dunn are reported in Table 1.
In Table S4, we regress the normalised certainty equivalents on SOGS-scores.
Regression I reveals that individuals with higher SOGS-scores are more risk taking,
which is indicated by a positive and significant coefficient for SOGS-scores
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(β = 0.010, SE = 0.004, p = .008). Furthermore, regression II includes an interaction
term for SOGS-scores and probability. The coefficient is significant and negative
(β = −0.016, SE = 0.006, p = .007), which suggests that individuals with higher
SOGS-scores are less sensitive towards changes in probabilities. In a nutshell, this
analysis reveals that individuals with higher SOGS-scores are more risk taking and less
sensitive towards changes in probability. The analysis on the group level and the
analysis based on SOGS-scores support each other. This was somehow expected,
because SOGS-scores and a classification based DSM-IV-TR criteria have a high
positive correlation (Stinchfield, 2002).
Figure 2 shows normalised certainty equivalents by probability of losing for the
three different groups. The normalised certainty equivalents can be understood as
insurance premia, because they are payments to avoid playing a lottery with a potential
monetary loss. The interpretation in the loss domain is thus reversed relative to the
gain domain, i.e., normalised certainty equivalents which are above (below) the
objective probabilities now indicate risk avoiding (risk seeking) behavior. As reported
by Vieider, Lefebvre, et al. (2015) and consistent with the reflection effect by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), we find risk aversion for the lowest probability
(prob = .125) in all three groups. As the probability of losing increases, risk aversion
decreases and at some point each group, on average, is risk seeking. A visual inspection
of the data does not indicate systematically different patterns among the groups.
Table S5 displays the result for an analysis comparing the PG and HG group to
the C group in the loss domain. In regression I, we observe a general insensitivity
towards changes in probability in the overall sample. This is revealed by a significant
coefficient for probability which is smaller than unity
(β = 0.680, SE = 0.025, p < .001). Neither the PG nor the HG group is significantly
different in terms of their risk attitudes, which is indicated by non-significant
coefficients for PG group (β = −0.032, SE = 0.035, p > .250) and HG group
(β = −0.016, SE = 0.036, p > .250). In regression II, an interaction term is added for
group classification and probability. The PG group is not significantly different in terms
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Table 2
Kruskall-Wallis tests and subsequent Post-Hoc tests after Dunn for different probability
levels in the loss domain.
Objective probability p.overall PG vs. C PG vs. HG C vs. HG
.125 .909 - - -
.250 .981 - - -
.375 .726 - - -
.500 .407 - - -
.625 .297 - - -
.750 .233 - - -
.850 .499 - - -
of their probability weighting than the C group (β = −0.108, SE = 0.061, p = .076),
while the HG group is (β = −0.150, SE = 0.063, p = .017). We do not want to
overinterpret this finding, because if it would be a component of gambling addiction, we
would expect a more pronounced effect in the PG group, which we do not observe here.
As a robustness check, we average the normalised certainty equivalents per
participant and probability level, and compare all groups by means of Kruskall-Wallis
tests (uncorrected for multiple testing) for each probability level. We do not observe
statistically significant differences (p > .200). Exact p-values for the Kruskall-Wallis
tests can be found in Table 2. As none of the Kruskall-Wallis tests is significant at the
conventional level of p < .050, we do not report any Post-Hoc tests.
The analysis is repeated using SOGS-scores as a continuous variable for gambling
behavior (see Table S6). While we observe a general pattern of probability insensitivity
(β = 0.680, SE = 0.025, p < .001), normalised certainty equivalents are neither
affected by SOGS-scores (β = −0.005, SE = 0.003, p = .133) nor by the interaction of
SOGS-scores and probability (β = −0.002, SE = 0.006, p > .250). Altogether we do
not observe systematic differences in risk attitudes in the loss domain related to
gambling behavior.
In the next step, we analyze the differential risk taking behavior in the gain vs.
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loss domain in the three groups, i.e., we analyze how groups change their behavior once
they move from one domain to the other. To do so, we introduce an interaction term
between group and decision domain (gains vs. losses) in Table S7. Since we did not
observe systematic differences in the loss domain, we use this domain as the baseline
and analyze how the groups change their behavior from this baseline. First of all, we
observe that normalised certainty equivalents for the C group, on average, are
significantly smaller in the gain than in the loss domain
(β = −0.064, SE = 0.016, p < .001). This finding suggests that the C group, on
average, is more risk averse in the gain than in the loss domain. Looking at the
marginal effects from linear combinations of the parameters and testing them against
zero, we observe the opposite effect for the PG group (Domain_Gain+ PG group :
Domain_Gain = −0.064 + 0.157 = 0.093, SE = 0.016, p < .001). This indicates that
the PG group, on average, is more risk taking in the gain than in the loss domain. For
the HG group, the marginal effect is close to zero and not significantly different from
zero (Domain_Gain+HG group : Domain_Gain = −0.064 + 0.069 = 0.005, SE =
0.017, p > .250) suggesting that this group shows similar risk behavior, on average, in
the gain and loss domains. Overall, we find evidence for differential risk behavior
between the gain vs. loss domain in our three groups. These findings are replicated
using SOGS-scores (β = 0.015, SE = 0.002, p < .001) in Table S8.
Finally, we look at the normalised risk preferences for mixed prospects (see
Figure S1). The average ratio of the potential loss to the potential gain is greater than
unity which indicates loss aversion in all three groups. As the distribution of the loss
aversion parameters in our sample violates the normality assumptions (Shapiro-Wilk
test, W = 0.91, p < .001), we used a (non-parametric) Kruskall-Wallis test to identify
significant differences among the groups. This test did not reveal significant differences
among the groups (H(2) = 2.94, p = .230). The conclusion remains the same when we
look at the ordinary least squares regression based on SOGS-scores in Table S9, as the
coefficient for SOGS-scores is not significant (β = 0.006, SE = 0.020, p > .250), or on a
regression based on a group comparison in Table S10 where the group coefficients are
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not significant (HG group: β = −0.309, SE = 0.214, p = .153; PG group:
β = 0.084, SE = 0.203, p > .250)
Parametric results on behavioral risk preferences
In the next step, we look at results for the parametric fits based on Prelec’s
probability weighting function. The results for the C group in the gain domain are
within the expected range with a mean of 1.02 (95% CI = [0.95, 1.09]) for δ and an
average value of 0.67 (95% CI = [0.57, 0.77]) for γ (Fox & Poldrack, 2013). By looking
at the 95% CIs, we see that the PG group has a smaller average value of δ (mean =
0.63, 95% CI = [0.58, 0.69]) than the HG (mean = 0.86, 95% CI = [0.79, 0.93]) and C
group. This indicates that the weighting function in the gain domain is shifted upwards.
There seems to be a decreasing trend from the C group over the HG group to the PG
group as displayed in Figure S2. The γ value is also smaller for the PG group (mean =
0.43, 95% CI = [0.32, 0.54]) than for the HG (mean = 0.65, 95% CI = [0.54, 0.77]) and
C group which reflects a more pronounced inverse S-shape of the weighting function,
i.e., a more distorted probability weighting. In Figure 3 we show a graphical
representation of Prelec’s probability weighting function in the gain domain based on
the fitted parameters. Both the upward shift and the more distorted probability
weighting are visible. We repeat this analysis for the loss domain. As expected based on
the non-parametric analysis, we observe large overlaps of the CIs for both δ and γ
among the three groups (see Figure S3). This indicates that also in this analysis no
systematically different patterns of risk preferences in the loss domain can be observed.
In Figure 4 we show a graphical representation for Prelec’s probability weighting
function in the loss domain based on the fitted parameters.
Robustness checks
We provide several robustness checks for our results. First, we fit the probability
weighting function by Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992) instead of the probability
weighting function by Prelec (1998). This was done to make our results comparable to
the study by Ligneul et al. (2012) and to show that our results are robust in regard to
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Figure 3 . Fitted probability weighting functions by Prelec in the gain domain. Shaded
areas indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
the different parametrization. The conclusions drawn from this analysis are in line with
our approach and therefore are not reported here.
Second, we repeat the whole analysis using a common power value function as
suggested by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) of the form v(x) = xα with α = 0.5 or 0.75.
The conclusions drawn from this analysis are the same as under the linear value
assumption suggesting that our results do not hinge on this particular assumption, but
are more generally valid.
Still, it could be that differences in the value function among our groups explain
at least partially our results. Therefore, we estimate the full prospect theory model with
probability weighting and the value function from above. In the gain domain, we
observe that the PG group has a smaller average value of δ and γ than the C group.
The 95% CIs of the estimates do not overlap supporting the view that the PG group
has both a shifted upward and more distorted probability weighting function in the gain
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Figure 4 . Fitted probability weighting functions by Prelec in the loss domain. Shaded
areas indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
domain. The 95% CIs of the estimates for the α parameter of the value function overlap
for all three groups and no systematic difference is visible. In the loss domain, the 95%
CIs of the estimates heavily overlap for all parameters of interest and groups suggesting
no systematic differences. This translates into probability weighting functions including
the 95% CIs that are clearly overlapping over the whole probability space. The results
can be found in the SI as Figures S4 to S7.
In a nutshell, our results remain stable, although admittedly the estimates became
less precise which is indicated by larger confidence intervals. This finding, however, is
not surprising because the value function will pick up some of the preferences for risk,
which are otherwise taken up by the probability weighting function. This collinearity
was ex ante anticipated and refrained us from estimating the whole prospect theory
model from the beginning.
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Psychophysiological results from the threat-of-shock-task
Figures 5 to 7 show the time course of the phasic driver response during the
anticipation phase clustered by shock probability (prob < .25: low; otherwise: high;
Figure 5 for the C group, Figure 6 for the PG group and Figure 7 for the HG group).
ISCRs by shock probability for all three groups are available in the SI as Figure S8.
The findings are similar to our previous study (Ring & Kaernbach, 2015) and show
higher electrodermal activity for higher shock probabilities. For the statistical analysis,
we run random effects ordinary least squares regressions. This approach allows us to
control for within-subject differences in reaction to shock probabilities and habituation
over the course of the experiment. Habituation is often reported in SCRs-experiments
(Boucsein, 1992) and it is captured in our analysis by entering the reciprocal of the
round number (Rec_round = 1/Round) as an explanatory variable. A positive
coefficient on this variable will indicate an habituation effect.
The statistical analysis of the data on the group level in Table S11 reveals that
ISCRs increase with the probability of receiving an electric shock, which is indicated by
a positive and significant coefficient for shock probability
(β = 0.770, SE = 0.060, p < .001). Additionally, ISCRs decrease over the course of the
experiment, which is indicated by the significant and positive coefficient for Rec_round
(β = 0.814, SE = 0.066, p < .001). We do not observe statistically significant
differences between the C and the HG group (β = 0.121, SE = 0.142, p > .250) or the
C and the PG group (β = −0.033, SE = 0.140, p > .250). The interaction term
between shock probability and PG group is also not significant
(β = 0.058, SE = 0.146, p > .250). We repeat the analysis based on SOGS-scores in
Table S12. The conclusions remain the same in the sense that there is no systematic
relation between ISCRs and gambling behavior, as the coefficients for SOGS-scores
(β = −0.002, SE = 0.013, p > .250) and for the interaction between SOGS-scores and
probability (β = 0.013, SE = 0.014, p > .250) are non-significant.
Although the findings from our two tasks are based on different measures
(physiological responses vs. choice behavior) and different stimuli (sensory stimulus vs.
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Figure 5 . Phasic driver by shock probability for the C group. Shaded areas indicate the
standard errors of the mean.
monetary stimulus), they both point towards a similar degree of sensitivity towards
losses. This finding appears relevant with respect to theories suggesting a direct link
between somatic signals and behavior, such as the somatic marker theory by Damasio
and colleagues (Bechara et al., 1997). Since we look at SCRs in a passive situation, we
cannot make any direct statement about active decision making. Nevertheless, the
findings from the two tasks support each other and it is worth noting that we observe a
significant negative correlation between the increase in ISCRs for high shock
probabilities compared to low shock probabilities, and the normalized certainty
equivalents in the loss domain (Pearson’s correlation: r(71) = −.24, p = .041). This
exploratory finding indicates a link between the physiological reactions in the
threat-of-shock task, and the behavioral risk measures supporting the idea of a similar
sensitivity towards negative outcomes for problem gamblers vs. controls.
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Figure 6 . Phasic driver by shock probability for the PG group. Shaded areas indicate
the standard errors of the mean.
Discussion
Our data reveals that problem gamblers are systematically more risk taking and
less sensitive towards changes in probabilities in the gain domain than non-gambling
controls. This finding holds for a non-parametric comparison that is based on
normalized certainty equivalents, but also for a parametric approach that is based on
prospect theory. Neither in the loss domain nor for mixed prospect we find
systematically different patterns. Furthermore, no statistically significant differences in
terms of ISCRs during the anticipation of electric shocks with a varying probability of
occurrence were detected.
At the beginning of the paper, we outlined three hypotheses which have been
brought up to provide an explanation for excessive risk taking observed in gambling
addiction within the prospect theory framework. According to the probability distortion
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Figure 7 . Phasic driver by shock probability for the HG group. Shaded areas indicate
the standard errors of the mean.
hypothesis, problem gamblers have a distorted weighting of winning probabilities, which
makes them overly optimistic. The probability elevation hypothesis argues that risk
preferences in the gain (loss) domain are generally shifted upwards (downwards), which
makes gambling more attractive but also many other risky activities. Finally, the loss
aversion hypothesis states that problem gamblers are less sensitive towards losses
relative to gains. Our findings support both the probability distortion and the
probability elevation hypothesis, while we do not find evidence for the loss aversion
hypothesis. We observe an upwards shifted and more distorted probability weighting
function, however, only in the gain domain. In the loss domain, we do not find
significantly different patterns in risk attitudes. This suggests that the upwards shift in
the gain domain is neither amplified nor counterbalanced by changes in the loss domain.
Our findings hold for a non-parametric group comparison, a non-parametric analysis
based on SOGS-scores and also for a parametric approach based on the probability
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weighting function by Prelec.
A limited number of studies has analyzed risk preferences of problem gamblers
(Brevers et al., 2012; Gelskov et al., 2016; Giorgetta et al., 2014; Ligneul et al., 2012;
Takeuchi et al., 2015). Comparing these studies with ours, we observe three
fundamental differences in the experimental designs. First, we explore risk preferences
including probability weighting for gain-only, loss-only and mixed prospects. Most
existing studies focus on single aspects of the risk attitude space. While some studies
focus on mixed gambles without taking probability weighting into account (Brevers et
al., 2012; Gelskov et al., 2016; Giorgetta et al., 2014; Takeuchi et al., 2015), others focus
on the gain domain with probability weighting without considering the loss domain
(Ligneul et al., 2012) . Secondly, we provide incentives in order to make our findings
more comparable to the real world. Some of the aforementioned studies use
hypothetical incentives (Brevers et al., 2012; Ligneul et al., 2012; Takeuchi et al., 2015).
Thirdly, we include habitual gamblers as an additional control group. This approach
allows us to treat gambling addiction as a continuous variable (Strong & Kahler, 2007).
It is important to discuss several limitations of our study. First, we assume a
linear value function for all participants. This is a common simplifying assumption
within the literature which attributes all variance in risk attitudes to probability
weighting (Ligneul et al., 2012; Vieider, Lefebvre, et al., 2015) and thereby avoids
potential problems of collinearity between the value and weighting function (Zeisberger
et al., 2012). While it is a common assumption and we also provide several robustness
checks, we cannot rule out that differences in the value function between gamblers and
non-gamblers at larger stakes exist. Therefore, additional research is required which
involves significantly higher monetary outcomes and thereby more plausibly elicits
participants’ attitudes towards wealth. Empirical evidence suggests that relative risk
aversion is increasing with stake size in the gain domain (Binswanger, 1980; Fehr-Duda,
Bruhin, Epper, & Schubert, 2010; Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992), while the evidence in
the loss domain is mixed (Etchart-Vincent, 2004; Fehr-Duda et al., 2010; Hogarth &
Einhorn, 1990). Importantly, some studies suggest that changes in risk tolerance due to
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changes in stake size are not necessarily driven by outcome transformations via the
value function, but can be driven by stake dependent probability weights (Fehr-Duda et
al., 2010; Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992). This insight should be taken into account
when running large stake studies with problem gamblers. Second, our analysis of loss
aversion is based on two observations for each participant, which is lower compared to
other studies estimating loss aversion parameters (Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009). Hence,
this analysis is necessarily less reliable than our analysis of probability weighting which
is based on a larger number of observations. It is important to note, however, that
gambling typically does not involve 50/50 gambles and probability weighting appears to
be important, as suggested by the literature and our analysis. Third, due to ethical
constraints, it is typically not possible that participants gamble with their own money
in laboratory experiments. To study the loss domain it is therefore necessary to endow
participants with money at the beginning of the experiment (Berns et al., 2008). It is
known that this procedure can create a so-called house money effect where participants
are more risk seeking because not their own money is at stake (Thaler & Johnson,
1990). We are not aware of any theory suggesting a more or less pronounced house
money effect in gamblers, but we cannot rule out the existence of such a tendency.
Fourth, the causality of our findings is unclear, i.e., whether the probability distortion
in the gain domain is the cause or the result of the addiction. With our
quasi-experimental design, it is not possible to answer this question and longitudinal
studies appear necessary. Understanding the causality underlying our findings would
provide significant insights into gambling addiction. Moreover, it is important to
mention that problem gamblers can vary a lot in terms of their gambling activities.
While some might prefer gambles with known probabilities, such as roulette, others
might prefer gambles where probabilities are less clearly stated, such as horse betting.
Due to the different degrees of information involved, it appears interesting for future
research not only to study decisions under risk where probabilities are known, but also
decisions under ambiguity where probabilities are unknown. Usually, risk and ambiguity
preferences are studied separately. In the model by Fox and Tversky (1998), however,
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ambiguity preferences follow a two-step process of first judging the probability of an
ambiguous event and then transforming this probability by the probability weighting
function under risk. Under this model, the observed effects here would also impact the
decisions under ambiguity. Clearly more research is needed and particularly on the
question whether gamblers self-select themselves into certain types of gambling
depending on their attitudes towards risk and/or ambiguity. Furthermore, we tried our
best to match gamblers and non-gamblers in terms of variables that potentially affect
risk preferences independent of gambling addiction. Due to the quasi-experimental
design, we cannot completely rule out the existence of potential confounds. For
example, it has been shown that migrants are particularly susceptible to gambling
problems (Canale et al., 2017). At the same time there is empirical evidence suggesting
that migrants tend to be more risk taking (Balaz & Williams, 2011; Jaeger et al., 2010),
although there are different results for Germany (Bonin, Constant, Tatsiramos, &
Zimmermann, 2009). We did not record the participants’ ethnic background directly,
but created an indirect proxy which was based on ratings of their names for a potential
foreign background. The ratings were performed by three independent raters and
classification was done using a simple majority rule. Based on this method, 3 out of 25
problem gamblers, 2 out of 23 habitual gamblers, and 2 out of 26 controls were
identified as potentially having a foreign background. Including a dummy for a
potential foreign background into our analysis on risk preferences did not change the
conclusions, nor did the coefficient become statistically significant in any of the models.
Another limitation might be the random lottery mechanism that we use to provide
incentives for the risk task. It is important to stress that this procedure is only fully
incentive compatible under prospect theory, if participants make each decision in
isolation from the other decisions. It is debated to which extent this so-called isolation
hypothesis holds (Camerer, 1989; Cox et al., 2015; Starmer & Sugden, 1991). If
isolation is violated, there does not exist any incentive compatible elicitation mechanism
for prospect theory. We also have to acknowledge that our sample can be considered to
be comparatively small according to current scientific standards. As outlined by Button
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et al. (2013), general problems of studies with small sample size are that they have an
increased risk of reporting false negative and false positive results, and may suffer from
effect size inflation. The latter shortcoming might potentially affect our power
calculations. It is important to mention, however, that we study a group of participants
where the recruitment process is particularly challenging for various reasons such as
lack of incentives/motivation for participation, or fear of infringement of anonymity
(Parke & Griffiths, 2002). Collaborating with treatment facilities as other studies do
was not an option for us for the ethical concern of playing lotteries with people who are
trying to abstain from gambling. Finally, we observe no statistically significant
differences in terms of physiological responses during the anticipation of electric shocks
with varying probability of occurrence, and probability weighting in the loss domain
between problem gamblers and non-gambling controls. Although both findings are
based on different measures (physiological responses vs. choice behavior) and different
stimuli (sensory stimulus vs. monetary stimulus), they both point towards a similar
degree of sensitivity towards losses. This statement is further supported by a significant
correlation between the physiological responses and the choice data in the loss domain.
To conclude, we give an outlook to which extent our findings might have medical
applications and how they could be taken into account in the legal regulation of
gambling markets. Recent studies indicate that the interference with hormonal
mechanisms through drugs can have a selective impact on financial risk preferences.
Sokol-Hessner et al. (2015), for example, show that propranolol, a beta-blocker, has an
effect on loss aversion, but not on risk attitudes. While this is not the only study
suggesting an impact of hormones on decision making (Brunnlieb et al., 2016), it does
reveal that hormonal mechanisms potentially affect specific aspects of risk behavior.
Within the context of our study, this appears as highly relevant, if one thinks about a
medical treatment for gambling addiction (although we observe group differences in risk
attitudes and not in loss aversion). More directly related to our findings is a study by
Takahashi et al. (2010) showing a relation between striatal dopamine D1 receptor
binding and probability weighting. In this regard, it appears crucial to understand both
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the behavioral and neurobiological mechanisms underlying gambling addiction to
develop new therapies.
With respect to implications for the regulation of gambling markets, it is
important to note that gambling providers in Germany have several legal obligations
including a duty to provide objective information, which is usually realized by stating
winning probabilities, potential gains and stake size. At the same time, there is a legal
obligation to prevent gambling addiction. From our findings, both goals or how they are
currently pursued, appear orthogonal to each other. Because problem gamblers heavily
overweight small to medium winning probabilities, they are particularly susceptible to
this type of information presentation. Focusing instead on losing probabilities where the
probability distortion is clearly less pronounced for problem gamblers, appears as one
possibility to better align the two goals stated in the German regulation on gambling
markets.
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